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IN THE SUPRElVIE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PlainUff and Respondent, 
v. 
KURT l\L LY.MAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Criminal ·Case 
No. 2926 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by filing a Complaint in 
the City Court of Provo City, Utah County, Utah. It 
is charged in such Complaint: 
That Kurt M. Lyman on or about the 15th day of 
April, 1957, at Utah County, State of Utah, did commit 
the crime of a felony, to wit: Embezzlement, committed 
as follow, to wit: ''·That he, said K.urt M. Lyman, at 
the time and place aforesaid did embezzle $12,000.00, 
the property of the Lyman Finance Corporation of 
Provo, Utah County, Utah, which said money had been 
entrusted with said Kurt M. Lyman, an officer for said 
Lyman Finance Corporation, and did appropriate the 
same to his own use. " ( R. 4). A preliminary hearing 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
was had on the charge contained in the Complaint, and 
defendant was bound over to the District Court of Utah 
County to answer the charge contained in the Complaint. 
On August 23, 1957, an Information was filed in 
the District Court of Utah County, wherein it is charged: 
''Comes now Jackson B. Howard, District 
Attorney of the Fourt Judicial District of the 
State of Utah, and accuses Kurt :Jf. Lyman, he 
having been bound over to answer to this charge 
by a Committing )fagistrate, and charges that 
the said Kurt :JL Lyman on or about the 15th 
day of April, 1957, did commit the crime of a 
felony, to 'vit: Embezzlement." 
To the Information so filed, defendant, before enter-
ing a plea thereto, made and on September 6th filed in 
the District Court the following instrument: 
''Comes now Kurt M. Lyman, above named 
defendant, and moves the ·Court to quash the 
Information filed herein against the defendant 
upon the following grounds and for the following 
reasons: 
1. That the Information fails to state a public 
offense. 
:2. That so far as appears from the Information 
filed .against the defendant the charge therein 
attempted to be alleged is not the offense 
charged in the C01nplaint filed in the City 
Court of Provo City, and, therefore, the at-
tenlpted charge contained in the Information 
11uty or 1nay not be the charge upon which 
the defendant has had a preliminary hearing. 
3. That the Infor1nation is so uncertain as to the 
value of the alleged embezzlement that it can-
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not be determined whether the same was of 
a value to constitute a felony or a misde-
meanor. 
4. That the Information does not inform the 
defendant that which is charged to have been 
embezzled belonged to some one other than 
defendant. 
''If the foregoing Motion to Quash the Infor-
mation is not granted, defendant Kurt M. Lyman 
moves the Court to furnish defendant with a Bill 
of Particulars giving him the following informa-
tion: 
1. Who was the owner of the property claimed 
to have been embezzled~ 
2. What was the kind of property that it is 
claimed was embezzled~ 
3. What was the value of the property claimed 
to have been embezzled~ 
4. For whose use is it claimed the property 
was embezzled~ 
5. In whose possession was the property claimed 
to have been embezzled~ 
6. With what intention is it claimed that the 
defendant did the act with which he is 
charged f' 
The Court below denied the Motion to Quash, but 
required the State to furnish a Bill of Particulars. Not-
withstanding such requirement the District Attorney 
failed to file a Bill of Particulars but the District At-
torney did serve upon ·Counsel for defendant the follow-
ing document : 
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''Comes now' Jackson B. Howard, District 
Attorney, and answers the Bill of Particulars sub-
mitted by defendant as follows: 
1. The owner of the property claimed to have 
been embezzled is the Lyman Finance Cor-
poration. 
2. The kind of property embezzled was money or 
back exchange. 
3. The value of the property embezzled was 
$12,000.00. 
4. Kurt ~I. Lyman or Lyman :Jiotor Company. 
5. The Lyman Finance Corporation. 
6. With criminal intention, particularly the in-
tent to fraudulently .appropriate to his own 
use or to the use of some other person or 
corporation moneys or credits which has come 
into his possession by virtue of his trust as 
an officer in the Lyman Finance Corpora-
tion." (R. 6) 
The foregoing instrument so served upon Counsel 
for defendant was not filed, but on the contrary, on 
September 10, 1957, the District Attorney, without having 
served a copy thereof on Counsel for defendant, was by 
the Court permitted to file the following Amended In-
formation: 
· 'Comes now Jackson B. Howard, District 
Attorney of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of lTtah, and accuses l(urt :JL Ly1nan, he 
having been bound over to answer this ch;:p-ge by 
a Conunitting .l\lagistrate, and charges that the 
said l(urt l\1. Lyman on or about the 15th day 
of April, 1957, in Utah County did commit the 
cri1ne of a felony, to wit: Embezzlernent, in that 
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he did embezzle property in excess of $50.00 from 
the Ly1nan Finance Corporation." (R. 8). 
The defendant did not enter a plea to the Amended 
Information. He went to trial thereon on the 16th day 
of December, 1957. 
Upon motion of Counsel for defendant a mistrial 
was ordered because of improper statements made by 
the District Attorney to the jury and the introduction 
of improper evidence prejudicial to the defendant. (R. 
11). 
The case w,as again set down for trial, and a trial 
had on the 16th of December, 1957, which resulted in 
the jury being unable to agree upon a verdict, there 
being seven for acquittal and one for conviction (R. 33). 
The case was again tried on the lOth day of Febru-
ary, 1958, which trial resulted in .a verdict of guilty 
(R. 58). 
A Motion in Arrest of Judgment was made by the 
defendant and the same denied (R. 59). 
A 1\lotion for a New Trial was also made and 
denied ( R. 61). 
On February 20, 1958, defendant was sentenced, and 
the sentence suspended, subject to the same being 
amended ( R. 62). Notice of Appeal was served and 
filed on April 15, 1958. 
It is from the judgment of sentence that this appeal 
is prosecuted. 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment appealed 
from on .account of claimed error committed during the 
course of the trial in the following particulars : 
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ASSIGNMENT OR POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO QUASH 
THE INFORMATION. (R. 59-72) 
Af-:;SIGN~1EXT OR POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
STATE OF UTAH TO FILE ITS AMENDED INFORMATION. 
(R. 72) . 
ASSIGX:JIEXT OR POIXT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVI-
DENCE EXHIBITS B AND C. (Tr. 18) 
ASSIGX:JIE~T OR POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN PER:\IITTING THE 
WITNESS PAUL BLACK, TO ANSWER THE QUESTION: 
WAS THERE ANY AUTHORIZATION MADE TO MR. LY-
MAN, OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON, BY THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS, AUTHORIZING THE PAY:\IENT FOR SOME-
THING OTHER THAN FLOORING OR CONTRACTS. (Tr. 24) 
ASSIGX:JIEXT OR POIXT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE 
THE EVIDENCE OF MR. BLACK THAT FERDINAND 
ERICKSON WAS A DIRECTOR OF THE LYMAN MOTOR 
COMPANY. (Tr. 28) 
ASSIGN:JIEXT OR POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING MR. 
BLA·CK OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF COUNSEL FOR DE-
FENDANT TO TESTIFY THAT WHEN HE AND MR. HAR-
1\ION TOOK OVER THE l\IANAGEMENT OF THE LYMAN 
MOTOR COMPANY THERE WAS IN EXCESS OF $5,000.00 
OVERDRAFT AT THE BANK. (TR. 34) AND TO FURTHER 
TESTIFY AS TO THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE 
LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY. (Tr. 36-7) 
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ASSIGNMENT OR POINT VII. 
( 
·'< THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING MR. 
BLACK TO TESTIFY OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR 
DEFENDANT THAT DEFENDANT WAS OWING TO THE 
LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 
$800.00. (Tr. 68) 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING EXHIBIT 
J TO BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE OVER THE OBJEC-
TION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT. (Tr. 72) 
ASSIGNMEXT OR POINT IX. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE 
THE STATEMENT OF MR. CARLISLE WHILE TESTIFYING 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF THAT THE SITUATION WAS BE-
YOND THE STAGE OF BEING CONTRACTS, AND WERE 
OF A CRIMINAL NATURE. (Tr. 88-89) 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT X. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL 
FOR DEFENDANT, UNDER THE GUISE OF CROSS-EX-
AMINATION TO INTERROGATE THE DEFENDANT AS 
TO ·CERTAIN CHECKS MADE OUT BY VARIOUS PERSONS 
TO VARIOUS OTHER PERSONS. (Tr. 196-204) 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN REQUEST BY 
DEFENDANT IN HIS REQUEST NO. 1. 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN REQUEST NO. 2. 
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ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT IN 
HIS REQUEST NO. 4. 
ASSIGNMEN·T OR POINT XIV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT IN HIS 
REQUEST NO. 5·, AND IN GIVING IN LIEU THEREOF 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5, AND PARTICULARLY THAT POR-
TION OF INSTRUCTION NO. 5 WHEREIN THE JURY WAS 
INSTRUCTED TO THE EFFEoCT THAT A PERSON IS 
GUILTY OF EMBEZZLING PROPERTY WHETHER THE 
PERSON DERIVES ANY BENEFIT HIMSELF FROM THE 
TRANSACTION, OR WHETHER OR NOT HE INTENDS 
TO RETURN THE MONEY OR OTHER PROPERTY TAKEN 
AT SOME LATER TIME, OR TO MAKE RESTITUTION TO 
ITS RIGHTFUL OWNER. 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
TO THE JURY APPELLANT'S REQUEST NO. 8. 
ASSIGN~fENT OR POIXT XYI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS NINTH 
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY, AND IN PARTICULARLY 
THAT PORTION OF SUCH INSTRUCTION WHICH IGNORES 
THE FACT THAT THE ARTICLES OF IN.CORPORATION 
OF LYMAN FINANCE CORPORATION EXPRESSLY AUTH-
ORIZED THE LOANING OF ITS MONEY. 
ASSIGNl\!IEXT OR POIXT XYII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT. 
ASSIGN11ENT OR POI~T XYIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT A NEW TRIAL. 
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ARGUMENT 
ASSIGNMENTS OR POINTS I, II, and XI 
ASSIGNlVIENT OR POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO QUASH 
THE INFORMATION. (R. 59-72) 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
STATE OF UTAH TO FILE ITS AMENDED INFORMATION. 
(R. 72) 
ASSIGNl\lENT OR POINT XI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN REQUEST BY 
DEFENDANT IN HIS REQUEST NO. 1. 
THE ERRORS vVHICH APPELLANT CLAIMS WERE 
.COMMITTED BY REASON OF POINTS OR ASSIGNMENTS 
I, II AND XI, IN THE MAIN, INVOLVED THE SAME QUES-
TION OF LAW, AND THEREFORE, WE SHALL DISCUSS 
SUCH ASSIGNMENTS OR POINTS TOGETHER. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 77-23-3, provides that a 
Motion to Quash an Information shall be available on 
one or more of the following grounds : 
1 (b) That the court has ordered a bill of par-
ticulars under the provisions of Section 
77-21-9 and the prosecuting attorney fails 
to furnish a sufficient bill. 
2(a) That an information was filed without the 
defendant first having had or waived a 
preliminary examination. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 77-21-6, provides for the 
form of an information in this language: 
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"X.Y. the district attorney for the ___________________ _ 
district accuses A.B. of (here charge the offense 
in one of the ways mentioned in section 77 -21-8-e.g. 
murder, assault with intent to kill, poisoning an 
animal contrary to section 76-5-12 of the Penal 
Code) and charges that (here the particulars of 
offense may be added with a view to avoiding the 
necessity for a bill of particulars)." 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 77-21-8, provides that 
an information is valid and sufficient if it charges the 
offense for which defendant is being prosecuted in one 
or more of the following ways: 
"(a) 
(b) 
(2) 
By using the name given to the offense 
by the common law or by a statute. 
By stating so much of the definiting of the 
offense, either in terms of the common law 
or of the statute defining the offense or 
in terms of substantially the same mean-
ing, as is sufficient to give the court and 
the defendant notice of what offense is 
intended to be charged. 
The information may refer to a section or 
subsection of any statute creating the of-
fense charged therein, and in determining 
the validity or sufficiency of such informa-
tion or indictn1ent regard shall be had to 
such reference.'' 
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-5-
11, referred to in the form of .an infonnation is of 
little or no aid in detennining the sufficiency of the 
information in this case. 
E1nbezzlen1ent is thus defined in Utalz Code Amw-
tated, 1953, 76-17-1: 
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"Embezzlmnent is the fraudulent appropria-
tion of property by a person to whom it has 
been intrusted.'' 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-17-2, provides that: 
''Every officer, director, trustee, clerk, ser-
vant or .agent of any association, society or cor-
poration, public or private, who fraudulently ap-
propriates to any use or purpose not in the due 
and lawful execution of his trust any property 
which he has in his possession or under his 
control by virtue of his trust, or secretes the 
same with a fraudulent intent to appropriate it 
to such use or purpose, is guilty of embezzle-
ment." 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-17-3, provides: 
"That a carrier or other person having per-
sonal property for transportation is guilty of 
embezzlement if such property is fraudulently 
appropriated to a use other than for its safe 
keeping.'' 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-17-4, makes it the 
crime of embezzlement for a bank, trustee, merchant, 
broker, attorney, agent, assignee in trust, executor, ad-
ministrator, collector, or other person having control of 
personal property guilty of embezzlement if he fraudu-
lently appropriates the same to a use other than the 
lawful execution of his trust. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-17-5, contains similar 
provisions as to a bailee, servant, attorney-in-fact, etc. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-17-6, contains a sim-
ilar provision as to a bank officer or employee. 
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-17-7, provides that: 
''Every clerk, agent or servant of any person 
who fraudulently appropriates to his own use or 
secretes with a fraudulent intent to appropriate to 
his own use any property of another which has 
come into his control or care by virtue of his 
employment as such clerk, agent or servant, is 
guilty of embezzlement.'' 
It will be seen that in the complaint filed in the 
City Court upon which the defendant had his prelimin-
ary hearing, and upon which he was bound over to the 
District Court, he was charged with having appropriated 
$12,000.00 to his own use. It will also be seen that in 
the original information filed in the District Court the 
defendant was merely charged with having committed 
the crime of embezzlement. In compliance ·with the de-
mand for a Bill of Particulars defendant was informed 
that he had appropriated either money or bank exchange, 
either to his own use, or to the use of the Lyinan ~lotor 
Company. That defendant had the intention of fraudu-
lently appropriating the 1noney to his own use or to 
the use of some other person or corporation, money or 
credit which had con1e into his possession by virtue of 
his trust as an officer of Ly1nan Finance Corporation. 
Contrary to the require1nents of U.C.A. 1953, ?7-21-9, the 
Bill of Particulars w.as not filed of record. That there-
after the State was pennitted to file an Amended In-
formation in whieh defendant was charged with having 
committed the crime of embezzling property in excess 
of $50.00 fr01n the Ly1nan Financ-e Corporation (R. 8). 
\ 
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It was upon the Amended Information that defendant 
went to trial. It will be seen that by U.C.A., 1953, 77-21-9 
a new Bill of Particulars shall supersede any previous 
bill. Apparently it was sought by the Amended Infor-
mation to supercede the Bill of Particulars and by that 
means deprive the defendant of all definite information 
of the charge he was required to answer. 
This Court is committed to the following propo-
sitions of law: 
1. That one charged with a crime may be bound over 
to the District Court to answer only to the charge 
contained in the Complaint filed before the Com-
mitting Magistrate, and upon which he has been 
given a preliminary hearing, unless such prelimi-
nary hearing, with consent of the State, is waived, 
or of an offense necessarily included within the 
charged offense. 
Among the cases so holding are State v. Pay, 45 Utah 
411, 146 Pac. 300; State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125, 71 Pac. 
(2d) 196; State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 Pac. (2d) 
949. 
It is said in the case of State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 
33 Pac. (2d) 640, that: 
'' ]1--,or lesser offense to be necessarily included 
in greater offense within statute permitting con-
nection of offense charged, the lesser offense 
must of necessity be embraced within legal defin-
ition of greater offense .and be part therof. '' 
2. While the short form of an information such as 
that provided for in U.C.A. 1953, 77-21-8, has been 
held not to offend against the provisions of Arti-
cle One, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah 
wherein it is provided that in criminal prosecu-
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tion the accused has a right to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, none-the-
less one charged with a crime is entitled to the 
benefits of such constitional provision. 
State v. HiJll, 3 Utah 334, 3 Pac. 75. State v. Jensen, 
98 Utah 482, 100 Pac. (2d) 969; State v. Hale, 71 Utah 
134, 263 Pac. 86; State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 281, 121 
Pac. 912. 
While a Bill of Particulars is not a part of an infor-
Ination, however, the granting thereof is not discretion-
ary, but is a matter of right if the statutory conditions 
are present. State v. Solomon, 93 Utah 70, 71 Pac. (2d) 
104. 
So, also, is it the settled law in this jurisdiction that 
the sufficiency or insufficiency of an information must 
be tested by its allegations and not by the evidence in-
troduced at the trial. State v. Fisher, 79 Utah 115, 8 Pac. 
(2d) 589; Ballm:ne, et al. v. DV8trict Court of F~rst Judi-
cial District for Box Elder County, et. al., 107 Utah 247, 
133 Pac. (2d) 265; State v. Solomon, supra. 
It will be seen that the cmnplaint filed. before the 
committing magistrate did inforn1 the defendant of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, namely: 
of having rnis.appropriated to his own use the sum of 
$12,000.00 belonging to Lyn1an Finance Cmnpany. For 
some unknown reason the original infonnation rnerely 
charged that ](urt ~L Lyrnan cmnn1itted the crime of 
ernbezzlernent on or about ~\pril15. 1957. That informa-
tion is t>ntirely silent as to whose property ·was mis-
appropriated, the nature or the an1ount thereof, for 
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whose use and benefit the same was appropriated, or the 
provision of the Utah Statutes that were offended 
against. It may here be noted that the crime of embezzle-
ment did not exist at common law, 18 Arn. Jur. 571. 
It would seem clear that since the information utterly 
failed to give defendant the necessary information to 
enable him to defend against the same, that, therefore, 
he was entitled to a Bill of Particulars. 
We assumed that when the Bill of Particulars was 
ordered and .a copy thereof was served upon Counsel, 
the original was filed in the cause as by law provided. 
It was not until this appeal was prosecuted that Counsel 
'for defendant learned that the proposed Bill of Particu-
lars had not been so filed. Apparently Counsel for the 
State sought to escape being bound by the Bill of Par-
. ticulars by filing the Amended Information. It would 
seem obvious that the defendant may not thus be denied 
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation he is called upon to defend 
against. 
Moreover, the Amended Information upon which de-
fendant was tried is about as vague and uncertain as it 
could have been drawn within the charge contained in the 
Complaint upon which he was charged in the Complaint 
filed in the City Court and upon which he had a prelimi-
nary hearing, and upon which he was bound over to the 
District ·Court. Such information was calculated to keep 
defendant in the dark .as to the particulars of the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him. He was merely 
informed that he was charged with having embezzled 
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property in excess of $50.00 from the Lyman Finance 
Corporation. Under such allegation the evidence offered 
by the State as to issuance of three separate checks by 
defendant was received in evidence, one of such checks 
was for $12,000.00, one for $246.97, and one for $1753.03. 
Such checks were marked P-C, D and H. (Trs. 78-21) 
It seems clear that if the issuance of either of the 
three above Inentioned checks constitute an offense, the 
issuance of each constituted a separate offense. \Ve 
have a statute, U.C . .A. 1953, 77-21-31, 'vhich provides 
that the information must charge but one offense. If 
in this case an information may be drawn in such 
vague and uncertain language as to bring within such 
language a number of claimed offenses, and if, as was 
done in this case, the three checks were properly re-
ceived in evidence, then and under such circumstances 
the provisions of U.C . .A. 1953, 77-21-31, are circuvented. 
That is to say, if by the use of vague and uncertain 
language broad enough to coYer two for 1nore claimed 
offenses, the accused is required to guess as to the 
particular acts he is called upon to answer, and if at 
the trial evidence is offered .as to nwre than one of-
fense, then and under such circmnstances accused is 
called upon to answer 1nore than one offense as effec-
tively as if he had been charged with n1ore than one 
offense. Indeed, if an infonnation nmy be drawn by the 
use of vague and uncertain language so as to permit 
evidence of nwre than one offense, then and in such 
a case that kind of an infonnation is fraught with a 
greater invasion of the rights of the aceused than if 
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he had been openly charged with more than one of-
fense. See State v. Beck, 85 Utah 531, 39 Pac. (2d) 1091. 
The trial court as a part of its instruction to the 
jury stated that the particular property charged to have 
been embezzled is money of the Lyman Finance Company 
in the sum of $12,000.00 made payable to the Carlisle 
Corporation and signed Lyman Finance Corporation 
by Kurt M. Lyrnan, President. However, such language 
did not inform the jury that the inforn1ation was limit-
ed in its charge to the item of $12,000.00, nor is the 
information limited to such a charge, nor was the evi-
dence limited to such a charge, nor w.as the verdict of 
the jury lirnited to the itern of $12,000.00. The verdict of 
the jury is that defendant is guilty as charged. 
A principle of law of uniform application is that 
the purpose to be accomplished by an information and 
a verdict of .a jury rendered after the trial is threefold, 
namely: ( 1) To inform the defendant of the nature and 
cause of the a0cusation filed against him; (2) To inform 
the court of the nature and cause of the accusation 
.against the defendant about to be tried; (3) To enable 
defendant, or other person to determine just what has 
been deterrnined by the verdict. 
It may be inquired: Was the defendant found 
guilty of the crime of issuing the check for $12,000.00, 
or the chek for $246.97, or the check for $1753.03 ~ No 
answer to such inquiry can be found in the evidence or 
in the verdict of the jury. But little aid in giving an 
answer to such inquiry can be found by re.ading the 
instructions of the Court to the jury. All that may be 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
said of such instructions is that the issuing of the 
$12,000.00 check is included in the charge. 
As heretofore stated, defendant was charged in the 
Complaint filed in the City Court of Provo with having 
appropriated the $12,000.00 to his own a0count. There 
is not a scintilla of evidence showing or tending to show 
that Kurt M. Lyman received anything belonging to 
the Lyman Finance Company for his personal use. The 
evidence is all to the contrary. (Trs. 29, 67 -222) 
It will he noted from the provisions ·of our statute 
dealing with Embezzlement that such crime may be 
committed in a number of different ways, one of which 
is by appropriating money to one's own use. Indeed, 
when one is charged with the crime of embezzlement 
the usual understanding is that the accused has taken 
money or property belonging to another and appropri-
ated the same to his own use. That is ,,-hat defendant 
is charged with having done. There is a vast distinc-
tion between the act of a president of one corporation 
using money belonging to such corporation to aid an-
other corporation of which he is president, and the act 
of an officer of a corporation appropriating the money 
of such a corporation for his personal use. In the form-
er case that may well be lacking moral turpitude. In the 
latter case uwral turpitude is of the very essence of 
the act. 
It is, to say the least, Yery doubtful if one reading 
the Cmnplaint filed before the City Court could reason-
ably anticipate that he would be ·called upon to defend 
an .ad of using the n1oney of one corporation to pay 
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the obligations of another. If the Complaint filed in 
the City Court may be so eonstrued, then and in such 
case, the Complaint is calculated to deceive rather than 
to inform defendant of the nature of the acts he is 
c.alled upon to defend against. Nor may it be said that 
the act of using the money of one eorporation to pay 
the debts of another corporation is included in the 
charge of appropriating money to one's own use. The 
State Legislature did not deem the one means of com-
mitting an act of embezzlement included with the other 
acts which constitute that offense. As will be seen from 
the v.arious sections of the Act defining embezzlement 
above quoted, that the Legislature specifically desig-
nates the acts which -constitute embezzlement. When the 
infonnations were filed in the District Court we know 
of no reaon why the defendant should not have been 
informed of the specific act, or the sections which it 
is claimed the defendant offended ag.ainst, unless it 
were to keep the defendant in the dark as to particular 
acts with which he was charged. Nor is there any good 
reason ·why the State should not have filed a Bill of 
Particulars as by law required, instead of substituting 
therefor the Amended Information with its vague and 
uncertain language which may be s.aid to include a 
number of acts which fall within the meaning of the 
language of such Amended Information. 
It is said in 18 Am. Jur., Sec. 43, page 598, that: 
"If there are sever.al sections of the statute 
concerning embezzlement which describe different 
phases of the crime by designating different per-
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sons, different property, etc., an indictment must 
be drawn under the proper section. Even where 
the difference involves only the relation in which 
the person stood who committed the offense, the 
one does not include the other, and a defendant 
indicted under one statute cannot be convicted of 
the offense disclosed by the other.'' 
While our Code of Criminal Procedure provides f,or 
the amendment of an information, there is no provision 
therein which permits the destruction of a Bill of Par-
ticulars by resort to the filing of an An1ended Informa-
tion, yet that is what is done in this case. So far as the 
record shows a Bill of Particulars was not filed, but in 
lieu thereof there was filed an Amended Information. 
If that may be done, then the right of defendant to a Bill 
of Particulars is rendered meaningless. As heretofore 
pointed out, the evidence shows without conflict that the 
appellant did not appropriate any of the funds of the 
Lyman _b-,inance Corporation to his ~own use, but devoted 
a substantial portion of his ti1ne in attending to the busi-
ness of such Con1pany without being paid anything for 
his services. That being so, he was entitled to have the 
jury bring in ,a verdict of Not Guilty as requested in his 
Request No. 1, and by the sarne token he was entitled to 
have granted his :Motion in Arrest of J udg1nent. 
ASSIGNl\fENT OR POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVI-
DENCE EXHIBITS B AND C. (Tr. 18) 
The court 1nay experience s01ne difficulty in deter-
Inining the partieular Exhibits to which Assign1nent or 
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Point III relates. That is due to the fact that there were 
three trials had in the court below with the result that 
some of the Exhibits bear more than on exhibit number. 
Exhibit B, however, contains but one identification as an 
exhibit. It is a check for $6000.00 drawn by Paul C. 
Black for and on behalf of the Lyman Finance Corpor-
ation. So far as is made to appear appellant had nothing 
whatever to do with the execution of that check. It was 
apparently offered in evidence for the purpose of show-
ing that appellant was responsible for the action of Paul 
C. Black, the Secretrtry and Treasurer of the Lyman 
Finance Corporation. ( Tr. 11) If anyone was guilty of 
misapplying the money represented by the $6000.00 
check, it was Paul C. Black and not appellant. Exhibit C 
is the stub of the check Exhibit B. What has been said 
about Exhibit B applies to Exhibit C. Neither of those 
exhibits had anything to do with the charge here lodged 
against appellant, especially the charge contained in the 
Complaint filed in the City Court of Provo. 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL .COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
WITNESS PAUL BLACK, TO ANSWER THE QUESTION: 
WAS THERE ANY AUTHORIZATION MADE TO MR. LY-
MAN, OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON, BY THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS, AUTHORIZING THE PAYMENT FOR SOME-
THING OTHER THAN FLOORING OR CONTRACTS. ('Tr. 24) 
It is, of course, elementary law that the best evidence 
of what the Board of Directors do is contained in its 
Minutes. At no time was Mr. Black asked about the 
Minutes of the Board of Directors. By the answer the 
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witness was permitted to express his own conclusion. 
Moreover, it is to say the least, doubtful if the action 
of the Bo.ard of Directors was material in that if the ap-
pellant was guilty of the crime of embezzlement by what 
was done, the Board of Directors was without authority 
to authorize what is clain1ed was done by defendant. \re 
shall have more to say .about this phase of the case later 
in this Brief. 
ASSIGNMEXT OR POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE 
THE EVIDENCE OF MR. BLACK THAT FERDINAND 
ERICKSON WAS A DIRECTOR OF THE LYMAN MOTOR 
COMPANY. (Tr. 28) 
It is the law of Utah that before one can be a director 
of a eompany he must, among other things, take an oath 
of office. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 1{;-:l-8, Schwab 't:. 
Trisco Min. and A1ill. Co., 21 Utah 238, 60 Pac. 940. Later 
Mr. Erickson was called and testified to the effect that 
he did not take an oath of office. ( Tr. 145) The only 
reason that we can conceive for offering the e"\idence that 
Mr. Erickson was a director of the Lyman 1\:fotor Conl-
pany was to justify the actions of ::\Ir. Erickson and 
Black in convincing appellant that .Jlr. Erickson and .Jlr. 
Bl.ack, together with Rulon Snow, should take oyer the 
business of Lyman .Motor Con1pany. (Tr. 149) They did 
take over the business, ( Tr. 30-33), atten1pted to amend 
the A.rticle8 of Incorporation, (Tr. 60-61), succeeded in 
getting appellant to ~urrender the power to yote his 
stock, (Tr. 61}, and after operating the business for about 
a nwnth the~· caused a suit to be brought by the Lym.an 
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Finance Corporation and attached all of the assets of 
Lyman Motor Company. (Tr. 37) The testimony that 
.Mr. Erickson was a director of the Lyman Motor Com-
pany could not have any relevancy to the question of 
whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime of 
ewbezzlement, and was calculated to confuse the jury 
and cast upon .appellant a suspicion of wrongdoing not 
connected with such crime. 
ASSIG~MENT OR POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING MR. 
BLACK OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF COUNSEL FOR DE-
FENDANT TO TESTIFY THAT WHEN HE AND MR. HAR-
MON TOOK OVER THE MANAGEMENT OF THE LYMAN 
MOTOR COMPANY THERE WAS IN EXCESS OF $5,000.00 
OVERDRAFT AT THE BANK. (TR. 34) AND TO FURTHER 
TESTIFY AS TO THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE 
LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY. (Tr. 36-7) 
The evidence of the overdraft of the funds of Lyman 
.Jiotor Company is foreign to any issue in this case . .Nor 
is there any evidence that appellant was responsible for 
the overdraft, or the financial condition of that Company. 
The admission of this and considerable similar inoompe:. 
tent evidence was clearly calculated to mislead the jury 
as to the matter of whether or not the defendant w.as 
guilty of embezzlement. 
As we understand the law, the guilt or innocence of 
an accused of the crime of embezzlement does not depend 
upon the amount of assets or liabilities owned by a corp-
oration whose funds are being disposed of. 
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ASSIGNMENT OR POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING MR. 
BLACK TO TESTIFY OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR 
DEFENDANT THAT DEFENDANT WAS OWING TO THE 
LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 
$800.00. (Tr. 68) 
• 
It would indeed be enlightening to kno·w upon what 
theory such evidence is material in this case. Can it be 
said that because appellant was indebted to Lyman .Jiotor 
Company in the neighborhood of $800.00, that, therefore, 
he was guilty of embezzlement of some rnoney frorn the 
Lyman Finance Corporation~ \Vas the Bill of Particulars 
abandoned by failing to file the same and the vague and 
uncertain Arnended Information filed so that the jury 
might find that defendant was guilty of embezzlement 
because he owed the Lyman l\I,otor Con1pany in the 
neighborhood of $800.00, which money in turn belonged 
to Lyman Finance Corporation~ It is safe to say that no 
authority can be found that will support the admissi-
bility of such evidence, on any such a theory. or any 
other theory. The evidence was calculated to prejudice 
appellant in the rninds of the jury. 
ASSIG N:J[ENT OR POIXT YIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERl\IITTING EXHIBIT 
J TO BE REtCEIVED IN EVIDENCE OVER THE OBJEC-
TION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT. (Tr. 72) 
Exhibit J is an application directed to the Utah 
State Securitie~ Cornrnission for pennission to sell stock 
to the public in Lyman Finance Corporation. It will be 
seen that the application provides, arnong other things, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
that Paul C. Black, a Certified Public Accountant li-
censed in the States of Utah, Nevada and Texas, was 
the Secretary-Treasurer and General Manager of Lyman 
1!--,inance Corporation, and was to receive $600.00 per 
month salary, and that $300.00 per month was to be paid 
to the Lyman Motor, Inc., for office space .and facilities, 
together with telephone and clerical services. The appli-
cation provides that the proceeds from the sale of these 
securities will be used in financing of autmnobile con-
ditional sales contracts with contr.acts for insurance 
premiums thereon. Source of such Conditional Sales 
Contracts is through Lyman M~otor, Inc., a Utah Corpor-
ation, of which Kurt M. Lyman owns the controlling 
capital stock. There is no evidence which shows or tends 
to show that on February 28, 1957, it w:as not the bona 
fide intention of appellant to carry out the objects n1en-
tioned in the application, and if there can be found in 
this record evidence to the contrary, the admission of 
the Exhibit for that reason is inadmissable in evidence. 
The application is in no sense a part of the crime of 
embezzlement. If appellant is guilty of the crime of em-
bezzlement, it is because of what he did without regard 
as to whether there was or was not an application made 
for the sale of stock in Lyman Finance Corporation. The 
admission of the Exhibit in evidence \Vas prejudicial to 
defendant, in that, it carries an inference that some of the 
money derived from the sale of stock in Lyman Finance 
Corporation was not used for the purposes specifically 
mentioned in the application. Later in this Brief we 
shall direct the attention of the Court to the provisions 
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of the Articles of Incorporation of Lyman Finance Corp-
oration which should be eonsidered in connection with 
the above mentioned application. 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT IX. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE 
THE STATEMENT OF MR. CARLISLE WHILE TESTIFYING 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF THAT THE SITUATION WAS BE-
YOND THE STAGE OF BEING CONTRACTS, AND WERE 
OF A CRIMINAL NATURE. (Tr. 88-89) 
Generally the expression of an opinion is limited 
to expert witnesses and even then such witnesses are nol 
permitted to give testimony as to matters not requiring 
special knowledge or questions of law. By refusing to 
strike the testimony as requested by appellant the jury 
may well have believed that the Court approved the 
statement of the witness that the acts concerning ·which 
testimony was being given were of crin1inal nature. 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT X. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL 
FOR DEFENDANT, UNDER THE GUISE OF CROSS-EX-
AMINATION TO INTERROGATE THE DEFENDANT AS 
TO ·CERTAIN CHECKS MADE OUT BY VARIOUS PERSONS 
TO VARIOUS OTHER PERSONS. (Tr. 196-204) 
During the course of the introduction of evidence 
on behalf of the prosecution, the District Attorney called 
the attention of the Court and jury to checks which he 
clairned were drawn on four different banks throughout 
the Stat<' of Utah on aeeonnh; in the nan1es of H. \Vill1elm, 
l\1ary Lyman, George ~\lhert and Bradshaw. (Tr. 31-3~) 
A hearing wa~ had before the Court in the absence of the 
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jury as to the adrnissibility of the checks claimed to have 
been n1ade out to :.Merlin Bradshaw, H. Wilhelm, George 
Albert and :Mary Lyman, which the District Attorney 
claimed constituted an unlawful operation of check kiting. 
The trial court held that the checks were not proper 
evidence. (Trs. 97-98) Notwithstanding the ruling of the 
Court in such particular, and notwithstanding appellant 
was not examined concerning such checks on his direct 
examination, the District Attorney on cross-examination 
was, over objection of Counsel for. appellant, permitted 
to cross-examine appellant .at considerable length con-
cerning such checks. ( Tr. 212-213) No claim was made 
that the checks were signed by appellant. Indeed, the 
District Attorney admitted that all of the checks, except 
one, were signed by the bookkeeper. While the checks 
were again rejected by the Court, it is clear that the 
exhibiting of these checks before the jury was irnproper 
and calculated to prejudice the jury against the defend-
ant. Such action is expressly condemned by this Court in 
the case of State v. Lanos, 63 Utah 151, 223 P.ac. 1065. 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN REQUEST NO. 2. 
(R. 5'5) 
In his Request No. 2 defendant requested the Court 
to instruct the jury thus: 
''You are instructed, .Members of the Jury, 
that the defendant is charged with having ap-
propriJated the sum of $12,000.00, the property 
of Lyman F~nance Corporation to his own use. 
Before you can f~nd the defendant guilty ~n this 
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case you must find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he did appropriate the $12,000.00 to his own 
use, a;ncl m this connect~on you are ~nstructed that 
even if you should find that he appropriated the 
$12,000.00 to the use of Lyman il!otor Company, 
you cannot find him guilty of the crime charged, 
and your L·erdict must be not guilty.'' 
Much of what has heretofore been said applies to 
this Assign1nent or Point. rrhere is this additional ob-
servation. The Amended Inf.ormation being so vague .and 
uncertain as to the particular acts with which appellant 
is charged, in fairness to appellant the gener.al language 
of such information should in any event be li1nited to the 
charge contained in the Cmnplaint filed in the City 
Court, otherwise appellant 1nay not be said to have been 
informed of ''the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him'' as provided in Article 1, Sectiou 12 of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
ASSIGNMENT OR POIXT XIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT IN 
HIS REQUEST NO. 4. 
In his request No. 4 appellant 1nade this request: 
''You are instructed that the defendant is 
not charged with any offen~e growing out of any 
contract or other dealings whereby Carlisle Fi-
nance Cmnpany adYanced 1noney to Lyn1an Motor 
Company, and, therefore, the defendant is not 
ealled upon in this proceeding to justify his 
aetions in such a transaction, and even if you 
~hould believe that defendant wa~ guilty of im-
proper]~· selling· purported contracts of L~'lnan 
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l\Lotor Cornpany to the Carlisle Finance Company, 
such fact, if it be .a fact, will not support a con-
viction of the charge here made against the de-
fendant, in other words, the only matter you are 
called upon to determine in this cause is whether 
or not the defendant is guilty of the particular 
crime of embezzling the sum of $12,000.00 of the 
Lym.an Finance Corporation.'' (R. 56) 
It will be seen that the trial court marked the Re-
quest just quoted as having been given. (R. 56) However, 
the same was not given .as will be seen from the instruc-
hons of the Court to the jury. (R. 36 to 54) In this con-
nection it may be noted that the record fails to show that 
an exception was taken to the failure of the Court to give 
Request No. 4. Counsel for appellant does not now recall 
whether or not he relied upon the notation of the Court 
that the request w.as given. Be that as it may, it seems 
from the provisions ~of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
77-37-4, that when written requests to a charge have been 
presented the question presented in such requests need 
not be expected to, and any error in the decision of the 
Court theron may be taken advantage of on appe.al. 
This Court has apparently construed such section in 
the following cases. People v. Berlt"'n, 10 Utah 39, 36 Pac. 
199; State v. Cooper, 114 U. 531, 201 Pac. (2d) 764, citing 
State v. Anderson, 75 Utah 496, 286 Pac. 645. In the 
Berltn case supra it was held that no exception need be 
taken in order that advantage may be taken on appeal. 
In the Cooper case supra the contrary view seems to 
have been taken. Neither in the Cooper or Anderson 
cases is the statutory provision mentioned. In light of 
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the clear language of the statute above referred to it 
would seem apparent that this Court overlooked the 
same. 
A reading of the evidence in this case will show that 
the entire case was based upon the claim that appellant 
paid the $12,000.00 check, together with the check for 
$1753.00 and for $246.97, to the Carlisle Corporation 
for invalid contracts that had theretofore been sold by 
the Lyman Motor Company to Carlisle Corporation. (See 
testimony of witness Albert Zenger, (Tr. 81 to 96), and 
cross examination of appellant .. Much of the same was 
objected to by Counsel for appellant. (Tr. 187 to 217) 
·Considerable of the cross examination exceeded the 
bounds of propriety, such as these questions asked appel-
lant on cross-exa1nination: 
"Q. Do you want to take the Fifth .. -hnendment~ 
Do you think that will inerilninate you if you 
tell1ne why it isn't fraudulent '?n 
Q. They are all bogus contracts, either no car 
or no person?" (Tr. 193 to 2:2:2) 
Notwithstanding the vagueness and uncertainity of the 
language of the Amended Information, it probably \vill 
not be contended that the giving of the cheeks to the 
Carlisle Corporation are offenses charged by the Amend-
ed Information. It may be even open to doubt as to 
whether or not the evidenee of the transaction had 
wherein the Ly1nan :Motor Company received m·oney from 
the Carlisle Corporation was c01npetent evidence, in that, 
such tran~aetions were in no sense .a part of the charge 
filed against appellant. It is apparent under the theory 
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of the State the guilt of appellant was not dependent 
upon whether or not the trans.actions had whereby the 
Lyman .Motor Company acquired money from the Carlisle 
Corporation, but upon whether or not appellant had a 
right to issue the Carlisle Corporation the check or 
checks in payment of the money owing by the Motor 
·company to Carlisle Corporation. Be that as it may, in 
light of the copious testimony about the transactions 
had between the Motor Company and .C.arlisle Corpora-
tion, the jury might well have believed that such trans-
actions were of controlling importance and appellant 
was entitled to the requested instruction. It m.ay be noted 
that at the trial which resulted in the jury being unable 
to agree upon a verdict, the Court gave the Requested In-
struction No. 4. ( R. 24) 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XIV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT IN HIS 
REQUEST NO. 5·, AND IN GIVING IN LIEU THEREOF 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5, AND PARTICULARLY THAT POR-
TION OF INSTRUCTION NO. 5 WHEREIN THE JURY WAS 
INSTRUCTED TO THE EFFECT THAT A PERSON IS 
GUILTY OF EMBEZZLING PROPERTY WHETHER THE 
PERSON DERIVES ANY BENEFIT HIMSELF FROM THE 
TRANSACTION, OR WHETHER OR NOT HE INTENDS 
TO RETURN THE MONEY OR OTHER PROPERTY TAKEN 
AT SOME LATER TIME, OR TO MAKE RESTITUTION TO 
ITS RIGHTFUL OWNER. 
In order to understand appellant's objection to 
Court's Instructi~on No. 5, it is necessary to have in mind 
these facts : 
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Mr. Black was a Certified Public Accountant with 
authority to practice his profession in Utah, Nevada and 
Texas. He was the Secretary-Treasurer, General Mana-
ger and a director of the Lyman Finance Corporation. 
See Exhibit J. He drew the Articles of Incorporation of 
the Lyman Finance Corporation by having the same 
copied fron1 the Articles of the Lyman :Motor Company. 
(Tr. 38-39) Among the powers of the Lyman Finance 
Corporation as contained in its Articles of Incorporation 
were these: 
''To acquire, sell, and otherwise dispose of, 
deal in stocks, bonds, n1ortgages, securities, notes 
and connnercial paper of corporations and indi-
viduals, to act as agents for insurance cmnpanies 
of Utah and receive applications for fire, casualty, 
plate glass, boiler, elevat·or, accident health, 
burglary, Inarine life insurance, all other kinds of 
insurance and collection of premiu1ns, and to do 
such other business as 1nay be delegated by agents 
for such con1panies, and to conduct a general in-
surance brokerage business, to lend n1oney and 
negotiate loans. 
''To acquire by purchase or othenYise, own, 
hold, lease, rent, 1nortgage .and otherwise to trade 
with and deal in real estate, lands and interest in 
lands and all other property of every kind and na-
ture. 
''To borrow 1noneY and to execute notes and 
obligations and security contracts therefore, and 
to lend any of the nwneys or funds of the cor-
poration and to take evidence of indebtedness 
therefore." (Tr. 39 to 42) 
Paul Black received a salary of $600.00 per n1onth, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
which was paid from funds of Lyman ~lotor Company, 
together with other expenses of the Lyman Finance Cor-
poration (Tr. 75). While 1\lr. Black subscribed for stock 
in the Lpnan Finance Company and agreed to pay 
$3,000.00, no part of which he paid, notwithstanding, he 
verified the Articles of Incorporation of such Corpora-
hon, stating that not less than ten per cent of the stock 
of the Corporation had been paid ( Tr. 45-46). When it 
was first planned to form the Lyman Finance Company 
the same was to be .a 1nere branch of the LYJ.llan ~Iotor 
Company. Mr. Erickson, a lawyer who assisted in the 
sale of stock in LYJ.llan Finance Corporation, so testified 
(Tr. 143). The two companies occupied the same offices 
and the rent was paid by the Motor Comp.any (Tr. 47). 
See also Exhibit J. Thus from the time of the organiza-
tion of LYJ.llan Finance Corporation the two con1panies 
had substantially the same powers as evidenced by their 
Articles of Incorpor.ation. For the most part their offi-
cers were the same, and their funds were used to pay 
the debts of the corporations without regard to source of 
such funds. It is apparent that the financial interests of 
the two companies were so comingled that the two com-
panies \vere treated as one corporation. So far as appears, 
no one objected to this manner of doing business until it 
was thought that the Motor Company was in financial 
trouble, when some of the stockholders of the Finance 
Corporation, particularly Mr. Black .and Mr. Erickson, 
conceived the idea of attaching all of the assets of the 
.Motor Company for the use and benefit of the Finance 
Corporation. In this connection it should be observed 
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that appellant did not keep the books of either of the 
two companies (Tr. 47-48). But that work was done 
by Mr. Horst Schwermer, who for a short time was 
succeeded by Rosa Maycock, (Tr. 103), who in turn \Yas 
succeeded by Paul Black (Tr. 49). The authorities as 
we read them te.ach that under such a state of facts 
one may not be said to be guilty of embezzlement. Such 
being the law, the trial court's Instruction No. 5 is erron-
eous. In light of the fact that the obligations of the 
Finance Corporation had been paid by funds of the 
Motor Company, it may not be said th.at appellant was 
guilty of embezzlement when he used some of the money 
of the Finance Corporation to pay debts of the J\1otor 
Company, especially if appellant intended that the Fin-
ance Corporation would in due time be reimbursed for 
any excess of its money used for that purpose. 
ASSIGXniEXT OR POIXT XY. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
TO THE JURY APPELLANT'S REQUEST NO. 8. (Tr. 239) 
By his request No. 8 .appellant requested the Court 
to instruct the jury 
''that the Articles of Incorporation of the 
Lyn1an Finance Corporation authorized the de-
fendant, Kurt M. Lyman, to loan the n1oney of 
the Ly1nan Finance Corporation to the Ly1nan 
Motor Company, and to borrow~ on behalf of the 
Ly1nan Finance Corporation, 1noney fr01n the Car-
lisle Finance C01npany. '' 
The attention of the Court is again directed to the 
provisions of the Articles of Incorporation of the Finance 
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Corporation which provides that such Corporation shall 
have power: 
''To borrow money and to execute notes and 
obligations and security contracts therefor, and 
to lend any of the money or funds of the Corpora-
tion and to take evidence of indebtedness there-
for." (Tr. 42) 
The evidence is all to the effect that appellant exercised 
the general supervisory powers over both the Motor 
and Finance Corporations. Indeed, the prosecution seems 
to have proceeded on the theory that the appellant was 
responsible for all that was done by the two corporations. 
During the course of the trial the prosecution apparently 
took the view that it was of controlling importance be-
cause there was written on the stubs of the checks that 
were paid to the Carlisle Corporation for Flooring. Such 
notation was made on the stub of the check executed 
by Paul C. Black. The evidence further shows without 
conflict that the money paid to Carlisle Corporation was 
carried on the books of the Motor and Finance Companies 
under the heading of Flooring, and that at the time the 
checks were given Horst Schwermer was the bookkeeper 
of the Motor Company (Tr. 172). The fact that the word 
flooring was written on the stub of the checks given 
to Carlisle Corporation did not have the effect of re-
lieving the Motor Company from the obligation to pay 
the Finance Corporation for the money that was paid 
to Carlisle Company. At most, the transferring of Con-
tracts to Carlisle Corporation w.as merely as security for 
the payment of an1ounts advanced by Carlisle Corpora-
tion in the transactions. The evidence so shows (Tr. 58). 
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Generally speaking an officer of a corporation who loans 
its rnoney is not guilty of embezzlement. 10 American 
and English Encyclopedia of Law 995. 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XVI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS NINTH 
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY, AND IN PARTICULARLY 
THAT PORTION OF SUCH INSTRUCTION WHICH IGNORES 
THE FACT THAT THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
OF LYMAN FINANCE CORPORATION EXPRESSLY AUTH-
ORIZED THE LOANING OF ITS MONEY. 
:Much of what has been said under the foregoing 
Assignment or Point XV applies to Point XVI. It will 
be seen that such Instruction in effect permits a jury 
to find a person guilty of embezzlement if he is negligent 
in conducting the affairs of a corporation. It is also 
stated that a president of a corporation has only the 
powers of a director, or such additional powers as may 
be directly conferred upon him by the Board of Directors, 
or by the Articles of Incorporation. As we have hereto-
fore directed to the attention of the Court, the Articles 
of Incorporation of Lyman Finance Corporation ex-
pressly authorized the loaning of its rnoney. The lmv 
as to the authority of the president of a corporation is 
thus stated in 13 Am. Jur. page 878. Sec. 898: 
"\Yithin the scope of his duties as head of 
the corporation and in the perforrnance of all acts 
of an ordinary nature which rnay fairly be deemed 
incidental to the .adrninistration of the office he 
holds, the president rnay act without the direct 
or special authority of directors.'' 
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So also is it said in Section 897, page 876, that 
"Irrespective of the inherent powers of the 
president there can be no doubt that the board of 
directors may invest the president with authority 
to act as chief executive officer of the company. 
This may be done either by .an express resolution 
or by acquiescence in course of dealing." 
Xumerouse cases are cited in footnotes which support 
the text. 
The evidence in this case clearly shows that the 
Board of Directors acquiesced in appellant conducting 
the business of the two corporations without any ex-
pressed restrictions being placed thereon. Indeed, if ap-
pellant was without authority to pay the Carlisle .Cor-
poration money belonging to Lyman Finance Corpora-
tion, the Board of Directors were without such authority. 
In its Instruction No. Nine the jury were further 
told that 
''A person who negotiates a transaction be-
tween two corporations, as an officer and agent 
of each of them, is required by law to act in 
fairness to each and to disclose to each facts 
which he knows or should know would reasonably 
affect the judgment of each in such transactions.'' 
By the portion of Instruction No. Nine just quoted, the 
jury were apparently called upon to determine whether 
or not appellant acted fairly when he used the Inoney of 
the Finance Corporation to pay the obligation of the 
Motor Comp.any. Doubtless, the stockholders of the .Motor 
Company would approve the acts of appellant, if by 
doing as was done in this case, the Motor Company 
could be saved from being forced out of business. 
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Instruction nu1nbered Nine, when viewed either as 
a whole or by its separate p.aragraph is calculated to 
permit the jury to find defendant guilty of embezzle-
Inent unless his actions in advancing the money to Car-
lisle Corporation measures up to each and all of the 
requirements mentioned in that instruction. \Ve have 
been unable to find any authority in support of such 
view and would be surprised if Counsel for the State 
will be more successful in finding any such authority. 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XVII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT. 
In addition to what has heretofore been said under 
our discussion of Assignments or Points I, II and XI, 
the authorities are to the effect that one is not guilty of 
the offense of embezzlen1ent when the property or 1noney 
embezzled or a part thereof belongs to the person or 
corporation to whom or to which it belongs. In this 
case the evidence without conflict shows that the 1noney 
or a substantial part of the money of the Finance Cor-
poration that was p,aid to Carlisle Corporation to pay 
the obligation of the .Motor Company actually belonged 
to the Motor Company .... ~s heretofore pointed out, the 
money of the Motor Company was used to pay the salary 
of Mr. Black while e1nployed by and rendering serYice 
for the Finance Corporation, and also to pay the rent 
of the Finance Corporation. \Yhile the mnount of 1noney 
of the Finance Corporation that was used to pay the obli-
gation of the l\Iotor C01npany apparently exceeded the 
an1ount owing hy the Finance Corporation to the .Jlotor 
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Company, such fact under the authorities does not sup-
port a conviction for embezzlement especially where as 
here the funds of the two companies were comingled, 
and appellant, so far as appears, was not familiar with 
just how the accounts of the two Lyman companies stood 
with respect to each other. Bishop on Criminal Law, 
Xinth Ed., Vol. 2, page 288, Sec. 343, 10 Amer. & Eng. 
Ency. of Lau', 995, and cases cited in footnotes. See also 
18 Am. Jur. 580 and cases of State vs. White, 46 Idaho 
124, 266 Pac. 413; State vs. Clayton, 80 Utah 557; 15 
Pac. 2d 1057. 
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XVIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT A NEW TRIAL. 
As to this Assignment, appellant adopts the claimed 
errors heretofore discussed as the basis for a new trial 
in the event the Motion in Arrest of Judgment should 
not have been granted. 
Appellant prays that the judgment be reversed, and 
that this Court directs the court below to dismiss the 
action and discharge appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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